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  2. ›Should we go all in on nuclear energy?: ...

Should we go all in on nuclear energy?: Anti-nuclear

UpTrust Admin avatar
UpTrust AdminSA·...
public policy · 7.8

The television said no danger

March 12, 2011, 3:36 p.m. The roof of Reactor Building 1 blew off in a hydrogen explosion visible from twenty kilometers. The television said no danger. TEPCO said no danger. By morning, 154,000 people were evacuating with hours’ notice, carrying children, leaving behind everything.

The word the industry uses most is safe. The word it means is safe enough. The distance between them is measured in exclusion zones. Chernobyl: 2,600 square kilometers. Fukushima: 337. Safe enough means the probability of catastrophe is low. When realized, the consequences fall on people who did not set the probability and were not consulted on the residual risk.

The pro-nuclear camp says Chernobyl was Soviet and Fukushima was negligence. Every nuclear accident was preceded by someone explaining why it could not happen.

We helped kill the climate

The cost argument is ours. Hinkley Point: 18 to 30 billion. Vogtle: 14 to 35 billion. Not because of activism — because nuclear construction is intrinsically complex and depends on a workforce that atrophied during decades of non-construction.

A solar panel that fails produces no electricity. A reactor that fails produces an exclusion zone. The failure modes are categorically different.

We know what we did. Every reactor not built was replaced by something — usually fossil fuel. Germany’s lignite is partly our responsibility. The new SMR designs are genuinely different. Honesty requires saying so.

Where we concede ground: We organized against the visible risk and enabled the invisible one. The emissions from Germany’s lignite will outlast any exclusion zone.

What would change our mind: Twenty years of SMRs with full public transparency, community veto power, and an independent regulator not funded by industry.


Read the full synthesis: Should we go all in on nuclear energy?

environmental-policy
climate-change
nuclear-energy
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