Mechanism Design for Harm Reduction

I’ve just posted a new paper on SSRN:

Mechanism Design for Harm Reduction: Game Theory and Social Choice for Carceral MOUD and Recovery Institutions

👉 Read it here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6173484

The core question: Why do our institutions so often default to punitive, carceral responses to addiction, even when harm reduction and MOUD improve health and reduce mortality?

Using tools from mechanism design and social choice, the paper argues that the “bad” equilibria we see in overdose and addiction policy are not random failures. They emerge from incentive structures that reward visible punishment, central control, and risk‑avoidant bureaucracy over decentralized, evidence‑based care.

A few themes that may interest folks in economics, public policy, and health:

How carceral logics get embedded in funding rules, compliance regimes, and performance metrics.

Why local actors can be systematically steered away from harm reduction, even when they know it works.

What institutional reforms could realign incentives toward treatment, recovery, and community‑based support.

If you work in health policy, criminal justice, behavioral health, or are simply interested in how mechanism design can illuminate real‑world institutional failures, I’d welcome your feedback, questions, and critiques.