The leash
September 2022. Someone detonated explosives on Nord Stream 1 and 2 at the bottom of the Baltic. The methane plume was visible from space. Berlin discovered what the security establishment had been saying since 2008: a pipeline is not a market instrument. It is a leash.
A trade relationship implies choice. A pipeline implies dependency. Germany did not import Russian gas because the market offered the best price. Germany imported it because Schröder built the infrastructure, joined the Gazprom board, and called it commerce. When the pipe broke, the commerce broke with it.
France generates 70 percent from domestic nuclear. When Russia invaded, France faced no supply crisis. It did not scramble to lease floating LNG terminals. France had what Germany destroyed: a power source that does not depend on a foreign government’s willingness to keep the valve open. Finland understood this without needing a war. Olkiluoto 3 came online April 2023 — the same month Germany shut its last reactors. One country on Russia’s border was adding sovereign baseload. The other was dismantling it.
The green transition argues renewables are the ultimate sovereign source. Half true. China controls 80 percent of global polysilicon and 60 percent of rare earth processing. Trading gas dependency on Russia for mineral dependency on China is a lateral move on the same chessboard. The nuclear advocates are right about the energy math. We push past their frame to why it works: nuclear makes a country harder to coerce.
Where we concede ground: France’s uranium crosses borders. Compared to gas it is sovereign. Compared to wind it is not.
What would change our mind: A continent-wide grid surviving a 2022-equivalent winter stress test with no emergency fossil procurement.
Read the full synthesis: Why did Europe reject nuclear, and was it worth it?