What are hyperobjects?: Skeptics
The word we already had
In 1962, Rachel Carson described pesticides accumulating in food chains, persisting in soil for decades, detectable only through effects on other organisms. Distributed, persistent, temporally extended. She did not need a neologism. She needed data, prose, and courage. The book triggered a presidential commission, the EPA, and the banning of DDT.
Morton identifies five properties: viscosity, nonlocality, temporal undulation, phasing, interobjective legibility. Translated: they affect what they touch, you only see local bits, they operate long, they move through awareness in waves, they are detectable only through effects. Every property applies to phenomena studied for decades. Epidemiologists study viscous, nonlocal, temporally distributed diseases. Economists study interobjectively legible financial systems. Ecologists study bioaccumulation phasing through food chains.
The speculative realists claim hyperobjects are ontologically novel — not just big but categorically different. The distinction between too large for any individual to perceive
and ontologically different
is exactly what Morton’s framework collapses. The Roman Empire was too large to perceive. The biosphere was too large before satellites. Too large to see
is epistemology. Morton transforms it into ontology. That is where the mystification enters.
Carson did not argue DDT was a hyperobject. She showed it killed birds. The birds were the argument. The theory was unnecessary. The pragmatists are more honest about what the concept does — it names a gap. But the gap was already named by collective action theory, externality economics, and temporal discounting research.
Where we concede ground: The phenomenological weight of living inside these problems may be real even if the ontology is overbuilt.
What would change our mind: If hyperobject theory generated a specific, novel prediction no existing framework anticipated, and it was confirmed.
Read the full synthesis: What are hyperobjects?